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|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| 9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA | |
| 10 | MARICOPA COUNTY | |
| 11 | DESERT MOUNTAIN CLUB, INC., | No. CV2014-015333 |
| 12 | Plaintiff, | MOTION TO CONCOLIDATE |
| 13 | V. | MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE |
| 14 | ERIC GRAHAM and RHONA GRAHAM, husband and wife, | (Assigned to the Hon. David Gass) |
| 15 | Defendants. | |
| 16 | DESERT MOUNTAIN CLUB, INC., | No. CV2014-015334 No. CV2014-015335 |
| 17 | Plaintiff, | (Consolidated) |
| 18 | V. | |
| 19 | THOMAS CLARK and BARBARA CLARK, husband and wife, | (Assigned to the Hon. Dawn Bergin) |
| 20 | Defendants. | |
| 21 | DESERT MOUNTAIN CLUB, INC., | |
| 22 | Plaintiff, | |
| 23 | V. | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | husband and wife, | |
| 26 | Defendants. | |
| FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. | 10985179 | |

PHOENIX

Plaintiff Desert Mountain Club, Inc. (the "Club") moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, to consolidate *Desert Mountain Club, Inc. v. Graham, et al.* (CV2014-015333) (the "Graham lawsuit"), with *Desert Mountain Club, Inc. v. Clark, et al.* (CV2014-015334) (the "Clark lawsuit") and *Desert Mountain Club, Inc. v. Lawsun, et al.* (CV2014-015335) (the "lawsuit"), which have already been consolidated. The claims and issues in dispute in the Graham lawsuit are virtually identical to those raised in the consolidated Clark and Fabian lawsuits. The Court should consolidate the Graham lawsuit with these matters to streamline discovery, facilitate resolution of the legal and factual issues, avoid any possibility of inconsistent results, and lessen the burden on the Court system.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>RELEVANT BACKGROUND</u>

A. The Three Lawsuits.

B. The Contracts.

Although the Club entered into "different" contracts with the Grahams, the Clarks, and the 3, the contractual obligations at issue here are substantively the same. All of the 10985179

Defendants' membership agreements with the Club expressly incorporate and, in executing the contracts, the Defendants agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions not only of their respective Membership Agreements, but also of the Club Bylaws, Rules and Regulations, Schedule of Dues, Fees and Charges and the Membership Guidelines. *E.g.*, Deferred Equity Golf Membership Agreement dated January 6, 2006 at 2 § 4, attached as Ex. A to the Graham Complaint; Membership Agreement dated March 29, 2012 at 2, attached as Ex. A to the Complaint; Deferred Equity Golf Membership Agreement dated November 11, 1996 at 1 § 1, attached as Ex. A to the Clark Complaint.

The parties' Membership Agreements and the Club's Bylaws address the methods by which a Club member can terminate his or her Membership in the Club, and the nature and extent of the member's obligations to pay dues, charges and other assessments imposed by the Club. Although the Bylaws have been amended over time, the Bylaws have never permitted members to terminate their obligations under their Memberships by resigning from the Club. Instead, a Member wishing to exit the Club must tender his or her Membership to the Club for reissuance and, until such time as the Membership has been reissued, continues to enjoy all rights and obligations of Club Members. In other words, Members have only ever been permitted to transfer their Memberships through the Club and have remained obligated to pay all Club dues, assessments and other charges until their Memberships have been reissued or resold by the Club. *See, e.g.*, Bylaws (2004), §§ 6.1.3, 6.1.4, attached as Ex. D to the Graham Complaint; Bylaws (2006), §§ 6.1.3, 6.1.4, attached as Ex. E to the Graham Complaint; Bylaws (2012), §§ 4.1–4.3, attached as Ex. B to the I

C. <u>Consolidation of the Clark and 1 Lawsuits</u>.

The Clarks and Fabians are currently represented by the same counsel (Daryl M. Williams) who also represents the Grahams.¹ On June 22, 2015, Mr. Williams, on behalf of the

¹ Mr. Williams has recently advised Club counsel that he has been unable to communicate with Mr. Fabian and is moving to withdraw as counsel for the Fabians without their consent.

Clarks and _____, moved to consolidate the Clark and l lawsuits arguing that the two complaints "are virtually identical but for the names of the defendants, as are the legal and factual issues" and consolidation would "facilitate resolution of the issues raised by the plaintiff and avoid any possibility of inconsistent results." Motion to Consolidate filed June 22, 2015 in CV2014-015334 and CV2014-015335.

The Club did not oppose consolidation of the Clark and lawsuits for pre-trial purposes. In its June 26, 2015 response, the Club simply requested that the Court defer any decision to consolidate the matters for trial at a later date explaining that although the Club filed complaints asserting similar claims, "those claims arise out of Defendants' breach of *different contracts* that Defendants allege give rise to different obligations and therefore different defenses (which the Club disputes)." The Club also noted that the two cases were currently in different procedural postures with different motions pending and asked the Court to ensure that any consolidation would not delay decision of the pending motions, permit re-briefing of the pending motions, or extend other pending deadlines.

The Court consolidated the Clark and lawsuits on July 1, 2015. Prior to consolidation, the Club had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the lawsuit. On October 16, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment against the lawsuit. The Club will shortly file motions for summary judgment against the Clarks and against the Grahams, similar to its prior motion against the

Given the current procedural posture of these actions, the Graham lawsuit should now be consolidated with the Clark and lawsuits. The Club has asked the Clarks and to agree to consolidate the Graham lawsuit with their cases. The Clarks have refused to consent to consolidation of the Graham lawsuit.

II. CONSOLIDATION IS PROPER

The Court may consolidate all actions involving a common question of law or fact pending before it. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The trial court has broad discretion to consolidate

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actions. *Reed v. Frey*, 10 Ariz. App. 292, 296, 458 P.2d 386, 390 (1969). Consolidation turns on whether the separate actions involve common questions of fact, whether there has been an unnecessary delay in seeking consolidation, and whether the parties will be prejudiced by the consolidation sought. *Roberto F. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec.*, 232 Ariz. 45, 52, ¶ 31 n. 9, 301 P.3d 211, 218 (App. 2013), *as amended* (June 20, 2013), *review denied* (Oct. 29, 2013). Courts also look at whether the cases arise out of related transactions, involve the same or related parties, and whether consolidation will serve the interests of judicial economy. *Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Ass'n v. Orlandini*, 227 Ariz. 288, 295, ¶ 21, 257 P.3d 1168, 1175 (App. 2011); *Behrens v. O'Melia*, 206 Ariz. 309, 310, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 278, 280 (App. 2003).

All factors weigh in favor of consolidation here: (1) there are common issues of law and fact; (2) consolidation will serve the interests of judicial economy; (3) there has been no unnecessary delay; and (4) no parties will be prejudiced.

A. There are common issues of law and fact.

As Mr. Williams has conceded in his prior motion to consolidate the Clark and lawsuits, the complaints in these matters are virtually identical but for the names of the Defendants. Each complaint alleges that the Defendants have unilaterally and improperly attempted to resign their Club membership, in breach of their contractual obligations, and that the Club has suffered damages as a result of the Defendants' breach. The Defendants have engaged in similar conduct, albeit under different contracts with the Club.

There are no material differences between the Defendants' contracts that raise different issues of law or warrant different results. The contracts are substantively the same in that Club members have never been permitted to simply resign and walk away from their obligations before the Club has reissued the Membership. Members have only ever been permitted to transfer their Memberships through the Club and have remained obligated to pay all Club dues, assessments and other charges until such time as their Memberships have been reissued by the Club. Nevertheless, the Grahams, like the Clarks and attempted to resign their memberships

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and walk away from their obligations before their memberships could be reissued. By failing to pay dues and other charges, the Defendants have breached the same contractual obligations to the Club notwithstanding that the Defendants breached different contracts. The differences in the Defendants' Membership Agreements do not give rise to different defenses. In fact, the Clarks and the Grahams have pled the same affirmative defenses in their respective answers. *Compare* Graham Answer ¶¶ 39-45 *with* Clark Answer ¶¶ 42-48. Simply, the legal and factual issues relating to the parties' contractual obligations are the same. Consolidation would facilitate resolution of these common issues and avoid any possibility of inconsistent results.

B. Judicial economy favors consolidation.

Consolidation will serve the interests of judicial economy for several reasons. First, the same legal issues will be considered in both actions. For example, interpretation of the Club's Bylaws will impact all proceedings. Second, the Club will call the same witnesses to testify. The Club has disclosed Robert Jones, Kelly Rausch, and Debbie Declore as witnesses in its disclosure statements to each of the Defendants. Therefore, discovery and depositions will significantly overlap and would be streamlined by consolidation. Third, consolidation will avoid the possibility of inconsistent results. For instance, the parties are currently scheduled to advise this Court, in writing, on their respective positions concerning whether Judge Bergin's determination has any preclusive effect on these proceedings in a joint Rule 38.1 report by December 11, 2015. The Club will shortly file motions for summary judgment against the Clarks and against the Grahams, similar to its prior motion against the ... Judicial economy would be favored if Judge Bergin rules on both of the anticipated motions for summary judgment given the common issues of law and fact that will be presented. For these reasons,

Although Maricopa County Superior Court Local Rule 3.1(c)(1) provides for this Motion

to be heard by Judge Gass as he has been assigned to the Graham case (which has the lowest case

number), it does not require that the cases necessarily be consolidated before Judge Gass. The factors governing the assignment of consolidated cases are set forth in Local Rule 3.1(c)(3) and

include whether substantive matters have been considered in a case and which judge has the greater familiarity with the issues presented (among other factors, none of which are pertinent

here). While Judge Gass has ruled on the Club's motion to dismiss the Graham's counterclaim,

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consolidation would streamline discovery, facilitate resolution of the legal and factual issues, and avoid any possibility of inconsistent results.

C. There has been no unnecessary delay.

The Grahams did not answer the Club's complaint until August 18, 2015. Judge Bergin just recently granted summary judgment against the and in favor of the Club in the lawsuit on October 16, 2015. Given the Court's October 16 Order, there are no longer any material distinguishing facts between the Graham and memberships that would warrant a different result, and the Club has filed this Motion within two weeks of that Order. Further, the parties are engaged in ongoing discovery, and no trial dates have been set. Consolidation at this juncture is timely.

D. No defendants will be prejudiced by consolidation.

All of the Defendants are currently represented by the same counsel (Daryl M. Williams). Notably, the Clarks and 1 moved to consolidate their individual lawsuits for some of the same reasons discussed herein. The Clarks' willingness to consolidate their case with the lawsuit dispels any claim of prejudice the Clarks may now raise by additionally consolidating the Graham lawsuit given the common issues of law and fact discussed herein. Again, the Grahams did not file an answer until August 18, 2015, and therefore that case is still in its preliminary stages and there is no prejudice to them.

III. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above, the Club respectfully requests that the Court consolidate the Graham lawsuit with the already consolidated Clark and lawsuits.

Judge Bergin has ruled on a similar motion in the Fabian case. In addition, Judge Bergin has reviewed extensive briefing regarding the respective legal positions of the parties, has conducted an extended hearing, and has rendered a decision on the Club's Motion for Summary Judgment. That Motion is substantially similar to motions that the Club anticipates filing in both the Graham and Clark lawsuits. Hence, the Club respectfully submits that the factors set forth in Local Rule 3.1(c)(3) support the assignment of all three cases, if consolidated, to Judge Bergin.

| 1 | DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. | |
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| 2 | FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | By /s/ Seth G. Schuknecht | |
| 5 | Christopher L. Callahan Theresa Dwyer-Federhar Seth G. Schuknecht | |
| 6 | Emily Ward | |
| 7 | Attorneys for Plaintiff Desert Mountain Club, Inc. | |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | ELECTRONICALLY FILED on the 29th day of October, 2015, with the | |
| 10 | Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court using AZTurboCourt. | |
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| 12 | COPY transmitted via eFiling system to: | |
| 13 | The Honorable David Gass Maricopa County Superior Court 101 W. Jefferson Street, Room 514 Phoenix, AZ 85003-2243 | |
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| 16 | The Honorable Dawn Bergin Maricopa County Superior Court 201 W. Jefferson Street, Room 7D Phoenix, AZ 85003-2243 | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | COPY mailed this 29th day of October, 2015, to: | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | Daryl M. Williams Baird, Williams and Greer, LLP 6225 N. 24 th Street, Suite 125 | |
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| 23 | | |
| 24 | <u>/s/ Phyllis Warren</u> | |
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